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CARROTS AND STICKS: HOW VCS INDUCE
ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAMS TO
SELL STARTUPS
Brian Broughmant & Jesse M. Friedtt
Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit from their investments in a star-
tup via a trade sale. But the startup's entrepreneurial team-the startup's
founder, other executives, and common shareholders-may resist a trade
sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is
low relative to the VCs' liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected
dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resis-
tance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the en-
trepreneurial team in 45 % of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an
average of 9% of deal value. The overt use of coercive tools (sticks) occurs,
but only rarely. Our study sheds light on important but underexplored as-
pects of corporate governance in VC-backed startups and the venture capital
ecosystem.
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CARROTS AND STICKS
INTRODUCTION
Venture capitalists (VCs) play a significant role in the financing
of high-risk, technology-based business ventures. Many of America's
best-known public companies began as VC-backed firms: Ama-
zon.com, Apple, FedEx, Intel, Microsoft, and Starbucks, to name a
few.1 Not surprisingly, venture capital is considered to be an impor-
tant contributor to economic growth in the United States and
elsewhere.2
The steps in the venture capital cycle are by now familiar.3 A ven-
ture capital firm creates and raises capital for a limited-life fund.4 The
VCs select portfolio companies for inclusion in the fund, investing in
these companies through multiple rounds of financing.5 Along the
way, the VCs advise and monitor the portfolio companies, sometimes
replacing the companies' founders.6 Before the end of the fund's life,
VCs "exit" from their investments in the portfolio companies and re-
turn capital to the fund's investors.7 The fund's investors can then
recycle the returned capital into another venture capital fund.
Venture exits usually take one of three forms: (1) an initial public
offering (IPO) of the portfolio company's shares followed by the sale
of the VC's shares into the public market; (2) a "trade sale" of the
company to another firm; or (3) the dissolution and liquidation of the
I See IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE
CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 6 (2011).
2 See, e.g., Josh Lerner, Boom and Bust in the Venture Capital Industry and the Impact on
Innovation, 87 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA EcON. REV. 25, 25 (2002), available at http://
www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/economicreview/econreview_vol_87_no_4-index.cfm (stating
that venture capital is "an important contributor to technological innovation and eco-
nomic prosperity").
3 See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2d ed.
2004) (providing in detail the various steps of the venture capital cycle).
4 See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP: LINKING GOVERN-
ANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY 54, 69 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001) (describing and
analyzing terms in limited partnership agreements with investors); William A. Sahlman,
The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 473-75
(1990) (describing and analyzing relationship between investors and VCs).
5 See BrianJ. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do VCs Use Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders?
Some Evidence from Silicon Valley, 18J. CORP. FIN. 1104, 1119 (2012) (finding that VCs gener-
ally do not use inside rounds to dilute founders); Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment,
Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1461 (1995) (analyzing the
structure of VC investments and attributing staged financing to information asymmetries
and agency costs).
6 See GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYS. &
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQuITY MARKET 29 (1995) (study-
ing private equity markets and describing VCs' imvestimg activities, including selecting,
structuring, monitoring, and exiting).
7 Id. at 34-35.
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company.8 Of these three types of exits, IPOs have received the most
scrutiny.9 This attention is not surprising. IPO exits tend to involve
the largest and most visible VC-backed firms.'0 And, perhaps just as
important, the IPO process triggers public-disclosure requirements
under the securities laws, making data on IPO exits easily accessible to
researchers.
But trade sales are actually much more common than IPOs and,
in the aggregate, are likely to be almost as financially important to
VCs."1 Indeed, in certain industries-like medical devices-and dur-
ing certain periods-like the last decade, when the IPO market was
tepid-trade sales are likely to be more important to VCs than IPOs.12
Unlike IPOs, however, trade sales do not trigger the securities laws'
intense public-disclosure requirements; they instead take place in the
shadows.' 3 Thus, although trade sales are important to the venture
capital cycle, researchers know relatively little about them.
8 Other forms of VC exit include VCs selling their interests in the startup to one or
more private equity firms, and one VC selling its interest to another VC (a "secondary").
See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1, 16-17, 19-20
(2012) (discussing how VCs are increasingly becoming sellers on the secondary market and
how buyers on the secondary market include both VCs and private equity funds). These
forms of exit merely replace some or all of the firm's existing VCs with new investors; they
do not substantially alter the relationship between the startup's investors and its en-
trepreneurial team. Thus, these forms of exit do not create the types of conflicts explored
in this paper-those that can arise in sales of the portfolio company to another operating
company. Less commonly, a VC may exit by having the portfolio company redeem the
VC's shares.
9 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. EcoN. 243, 243 (1998) (analyzing VC
exits through IPOs and the relation between the stock market and the VC market); see also
Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public
Offering, 46 J.L. & ECON. 569, 569 (2003) (finding that VC-backed IPO firms have more
independent outside directors).
10 See Ibrahim, supra note 8, at 14 ("[T]he company needs to be large enough to at-
tract research and investors.").
II See id. at 12-13 ("While IPOs have fallen off dramatically, trade sales continue to
occur."); see also Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs
Gone? 39, 44, 52 (Mar. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bear.
warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/Where%20HaveMarl5-2013.pdf (providing data on the rela-
tive decline in startup IPOs and increase in trade sales over the past two decades).
12 See Nils Behnke & Norbert Hilltenschmidt, New Path to Profits in Biotech: Taking the
Acquisition Exit, 13 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 78, 79-80 (2007) (reporting that VCs that in-
vested in medical-device companies traditionally exited via trade sale and that VCs that
invested in biotech companies are increasingly choosing trade sales over IPOs); Press Re-
lease, Thomson Reuters & Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Venture-Backed Exits Enjoyed
Higher Average Values on Lower Total Volumes in 2012 Uan. 2, 2013), available at http://
www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com-docman&task=doc-download&gid=929&
Itemid=317 (reporting that M&A deals have exceeded IPOs in terms of both number of
deals and dollar volume yearly between 2007 and 2012).
13 If the acquirer is publicly held and the acquisition is deemed a "material" agree-
ment, then the acquirer must disclose in a Form 8-K "a brief description of the terms and
conditions of the agreement. . . that are material to the company." SEC, Additional Form
8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Exchange Act Release Nos.
1322 [Vol. 98:1319
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The purpose of this Article is to shine light on how VCs arrange
to sell startups in trade sales. In particular, we seek to investigate how
VCs induce the "entrepreneurial team"-the founder, other execu-
tives, and common shareholders-to go along with a trade sale that
they might have an incentive to resist.
We begin by describing the standard cash-flow and control rights
that VCs receive when investing in startups. Turning first to cash-flow
rights, we explain that VCs almost always invest through convertible
preferred stock. In a trade-sale exit, VCs choose between retaining
their preferred shares (and capturing most or all of the proceeds
through their liquidation preferences) or converting the preferred
shares into common shares. In an IPO, VCs (as a practical matter)
must convert to common stock. 1 4 Turning next to control rights, we
explain that VCs seek board seats and shareholder voting rights, in
part to make it easier for them to exit and realize their cash-flow
rights.
We then explain why founders, executives, and common share-
holders are more likely to oppose a trade-sale exit than an IPO exit.
In an IPO, the founder (if still the CEO) can continue running the
firm and will face less direct oversight as shareholdings become more
diffuse.' 5 Other executives of an IPO firm can typically keep their
jobs, also with less shareholder oversight than before. And the origi-
nal common shareholders of the IPO firm generally do well; VCs
would not push for an IPO exit unless the common shares-to which
the VCs must convert in an IPO-have considerable value.
By contrast, in a trade sale, the founder (if still the CEO) and
other executives may lose their jobs or find themselves subject to
more direct oversight as shareholdings become concentrated in the
hands of a single shareholder (the acquirer). In other words, they
become "mere" employees. And because VCs in trade sales often exit
as preferred shareholders with liquidation preferences that must be
paid in full before common shareholders receive any payout, common
33-8400, 34-49424 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.
htm#seciic. Form 8-K disclosure only applies, however, to material transactions, and the
acquirer does not need to file the actual merger agreement or provide other details about
the target firm. See id.
14 In an IPO, VCs typically convert their preferred stock into common, either because
it is contractually required or because preferred shares almost never survive an IPO given
market resistance. Thus, VCs are likely to push for an IPO only when the common stock
they would receive upon converting their shares is worth more than the preferred stock's
liquidation preferences (plus, where relevant, the preferred stock's participation rights).
15 Black & Gilson, supra note 9, at 260-61 (noting that an IPO returns effective con-
trol of the firm to the founder-CEO).
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shareholders may receive little (if any) payout.16 At the same time,
the sale eliminates any "option value" (upside potential) of the com-
mon stock held by the founder, other executives, and employees.17
For all these reasons, VCs pushing for a trade sale may face resistance
from the entrepreneurial team, particularly when common sharehold-
ers receive very little.
Two points are worth emphasizing here. First, an en-
trepreneurial team resisting a trade sale may not necessarily believe
that the startup has a reasonable chance of going public if it remains
independent. Rather, team members may resist a trade sale today be-
cause they believe that, if the startup remains independent, there is a
good chance that it can exit in the future via a more attractive trade
sale-one that provides significantly better employment opportunities
for the entrepreneurial team and more value for the common
shareholders.18
Second, there may be situations where the entrepreneurial team
favors a trade sale opposed by the VCs. For example, the en-
trepreneurial team might wish to accept an offer that is personally
lucrative but which provides only a modest return to the VCs.19 Thus,
we do not claim that the entrepreneurial team will always oppose a
trade sale. Rather, our claim is that there are likely many scenarios
where VCs will favor a trade sale that the entrepreneurial team
opposes.
After describing the entrepreneurial team's potential incentive to
resist a trade sale, we then discuss the various strategies the team
might use to impede the sale. The executives and common share-
holders can impede a trade sale through their influence over the
board, which must approve the transaction. The common sharehold-
ers can try to block the sale by exercising their voting rights or by
threatening litigation. Finally, the executives can refuse to cooperate
in the sale process or, if the acquisition requires their continued par-
ticipation in the enterprise, refuse to commit to such participation.
16 Of course, if the trade sale is at a high price relative to total liquidation prefer-
ences, common shareholders may well receive a large payout even if the preferred share-
holders do not convert to common.
17 For a discussion of the option value of common stock in VC-backed firms, see infra
Part II.B.L
18 VCs, on the other hand, may want to sell the firm now and capture most of the sale
price through their liquidation preferences. First, the VCs' liquidation preferences cause
the VCs to bear most or all of the downside risk associated with keeping the startup inde-
pendent. SeeJesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Star-
tups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 978-79 (2006). Second, VCs may wish to sell the firm now to
show prospective investors for the VCs' next fund that the VCs can successfully exit their
investments. Third, VCs may wish to exit now because the fund in which the portfolio
company is held is coming to the end of its life.
19 See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 8, at 28-29.
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Next, we identify the various bribes (carrots) and coercive tools
(sticks) that VCs can use to induce a reluctant entrepreneurial team
to support, or at least not impede, a trade sale. For the founder and
other executives, the VCs can offer bonuses for a successful sale (car-
rots). The VCs can also threaten termination or blacklisting if the
executives do not cooperate (sticks).
For common shareholders, VCs can offer to share part of the
VCs' cash-flow rights with the common shareholders through a
"carve-out to common" (carrot). They can also use vote buying or
other transactions that dilute common shareholders' voting rights to
undermine common shareholders' ability to block a transaction via
their voting rights (sticks).
To investigate the use of carrots and sticks in trade sales, we use a
hand-collected database of 50 VC-backed Silicon Valley firms sold to
acquirers in 2003 and 2004. The firms are primarily in the biotech,
telecommunications, software, and internet sectors. The average sale
price is $55 million, but there is considerable variance in outcomes. A
number of sales are essentially liquidations, while other sales are for
well over $100 million; one firm sold for over $500 million. For each
firm, we collect data on the carrots and sticks used in connection with
the sale. 20
We find in our sample a heavy reliance on carrots. To induce
executives to cooperate in selling their firms, VCs frequently offer sale
bonuses. In 16 of the 50 firms, VCs pay an average sale bonus of $1.63
million. In 11 of 50 firms, VCs give common shareholders as a class
an average of $3.7 million extra. In 45% of the firms, VCs give at least
one type of carrot, with these carrots on average amounting to 9% of
the deal's value. Across all 50 firms in our sample, an average of 4.3%
of deal value-2.4% on a dollar-weighted basis-is used to fund these
two types of carrots: sale bonuses and carve-outs to common.21
We also find some use of sticks, such as threats to blacklist foun-
ders who refuse to cooperate and attempts to undermine common
shareholders' voting rights. But the overt use of these sticks is rela-
20 This paper builds on earlier work using portions of the same data set. See Brian
Broughman &Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firns, 95J.
FIN. ECON. 384, 385-86 (2010) (showing that common shareholders' ability to extract
carve-outs from VCs depends on the allocation of control rights between common share-
holders and preferred shareholders). In this Article, we use additional information gath-
ered in our study to provide a more complete picture of VCs' efforts to induce
entrepreneurial teams to sell firms by describing (1) the carrots given to both common
shareholders and executives and (2) VCs' use of various sticks, such as blacklisting threats,
vote buying, and vote dilution.
21 The use of carrots is greater in the 42 firms in our sample where the VC-investors
do not convert to common stock. In such firms, there is a greater conflict between the
entrepreneurial team and VCs. In this subsample of 42 firms, we find that VCs use an
average of 5.0% of deal value (3.1% on a dollar-weighted basis) to fund carrots.
2013] 1325
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tively infrequent. And although 60% of the founders in our firms are
replaced before the sale, we find no evidence that VCs fired or
threatened to fire founders to ease the sales of firms.
Our study makes three important contributions to the literature.
First, it sheds light on an important but underexplored aspect of cor-
porate governance in private, VC-backed firms. In particular, it high-
lights the potentially divergent interests of different players in VC-
backed firms around trade-sale exits and shows that VCs frequently
must overcome potential opposition to these sales.
Second, our study provides additional evidence that managers of
a target firm can extract value by holding up a sale of the firm. Re-
searchers have reported on the use of side payments to executives in
the sale of publicly traded firms.22 We show that such "bribes" are
used not only in public firms with dispersed ownership but also in
closely held private firms.
Third, our study provides some evidence on whether VCs are con-
strained from abusing their power in startups. The relatively infre-
quent use of sticks in our sample supports the view that reputational
or other nonlegal considerations substantially constrain (but do not
completely prevent) sharp-elbowed behavior by VCs in Silicon
Valley.23
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows: Part I de-
scribes the typical structure of VC cash-flow and exit-facilitating con-
trol rights in startup firms. Part II explains why founders, other
executives, and common shareholders may wish to impede a trade
sale as well as the means they have to do so. Part III describes the
carrots and sticks that VCs may use to overcome such resistance. Part
IV presents our dataset. Part V describes the carrots and sticks actually
used by VCs in our sample.
I
VCs' CASH-FLOW AND CONTROL RIGHTS
A. VCs' Cash-Flow Rights
In the United States, VC-backed startups almost always issue two
classes of stock: common and convertible preferred.24 The founders
22 See, e.g.,Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, What's in It for Me? CEOs Whose
Firms Are Acquired, 17 REv. FIN. STUD. 37, 46 (2004) (finding, in a sample of acquired firms,
that target managers frequently receive nonretention bonuses in connection with the sale
of the firm and that such payments average $1.2 million).
23 See, e.g., Black & Gilson, supra note 9, at 262-83 (1998) (suggesting that reputa-
tional considerations constrain misbehavior by venture capitalists in Silicon Valley).
24 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REv. EcoN. STUD. 281, 286 (2003)
(documenting the types of securities issued in venture capital financing rounds).
1326 [Vol. 98:1319
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and employees of the startup hold the common stock.25 The converti-
ble preferred stock is held by the VCs, who invest in startups almost
exclusively through this type of security. 26 Most venture-backed star-
tups issue a new series of preferred stock for each round of
financing.27
Like most preferred stock, VCs' preferred shares carry a liquida-
tion preference and are convertible into common stock. 28 If VCs re-
tain their preferred stock and preserve their liquidation preferences,
those preferences must be satisfied before common shareholders re-
ceive any payment. In this scenario, the VCs' cash-flow rights resem-
ble debt.2 9 If the VCs convert their preferred shares to common,
giving up their liquidation preferences, the VCs have the same
cash-flow rights as common shareholders.30 Thus, convertible pre-
ferred stock combines downside protection with upside potential.
In a trade sale, the VCs will choose whether to exit as preferred
shareholders and reap the benefits of their liquidation preferences or
25 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 386.
26 See Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 24, at 313. VCs' use of preferred stock may
have desirable screening, incentive, and tax-reducing effects. See, e.g., Fried & Ganor, supra
note 18, at 983-86 (discussing these effects).
27 While some of the rights of the preferred shareholders may be class rights, each
series of preferred stock is assigned its own exclusive rights and preferences, including
liquidation preferences that may be senior or junior to those of other series. This, in turn,
may give rise to conflicts within the preferred class over exits and other transactions. In-
deed, in certain situations, the interests of the most junior preferred shareholders may be
closer to those of the common shareholders than to those of the most senior preferred
shareholders. In this Article, we implicitly assume that all of a firm's VCs share the same
interests (vis-a-vis common shareholders, the founders, and other executives) around the
potential sale of the firm.
28 See Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 24, at 285 tbl.1 panel G (finding that almost all
VC financings in the United States involve securities senior to common).
29 Unlike the liquidation preferences of most public-company preferred stock, VCs'
liquidation preferences can easily exceed the original purchase price of the stock: the liqui-
dation preference of VCs' preferred stock sometimes confers the right to be paid a multi-
ple of the purchase price before common shareholders may receive any payment. See, e.g.,
ANDREW METRICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 152 (2007) ("In re-
cent years, it has become popular for venture investors to insist on liquidation preferences
in excess of their original investment."). When the preferred shareholders are entitled to
cumulative dividends, the liquidation preferences are even larger because the preferences
include, in addition to the multiple, any unpaid dividends (even if not declared). See
Michael A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, Effective vs Nominal Valuations in Venture Capital
Investing, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 199, 218 (2005).
30 VCs' convertible preferred stock may have "participation rights" that entitle hold-
ers not only to a liquidation preference but also to share (with common shareholders, on a
pro rata basis) in any additional value available for distribution to shareholders, usually up
to a specified amount (say, three times the original investment amount). Thus, the VCs
will convert their preferred shares into common stock only if the amount they would re-
ceive as common shareholders exceeds the sum of their liquidation preference and the
value of their participation rights. See Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors
in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 461, 466 n.18. For ease of exposition, our discussion of
VCs' cash-flow rights assumes that VCs' preferred stock is nonparticipating.
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to exit as common shareholders. If the VCs exit via an IPO, under-
writers will typically insist that the VCs convert their preferred shares
to common shares and give up their liquidation preferences along
with other rights attached to the preferred stock. To prevent hold-
outs, a startup's charter will, with respect to the holders of each series
of preferred stock, generally either (a) require all of the holders of
that series to convert to common stock or (b) allow a majority of the
holders of that series to forcibly convert all holders of that series to
common stock.31 Thus, one way or the other, VCs in IPO firms will
typically exit as common shareholders.
B. VCs' Exit-Facilitating Control Rights
To exit their investment, VCs must arrange an IPO, trade sale, or
dissolution of the firm. Below, we describe the two types of control
rights most relevant to facilitating an exit: (1) the right to fill seats on
the board of directors and (2) shareholder voting rights.3 2
1. Board Seats
The board of directors is responsible for managing the day-to-day
business and affairs of the company.33 Critically, the board is also the
only corporate body that can initiate fundamental transactions, such
as mergers, IPOs, and dissolutions.3 4 These transactions, in turn, are
almost always necessary for the VCs to exit; hence, we will call them
"VC exit transactions." Thus, VC exit transactions-including trade
sales-cannot go forward without board approval. But, as we will see,
board approval alone is not sufficient. Shareholder approval is also
necessary.
31 See Thomas Hellmann, IPOs, Acquisitions, and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture
Capital, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 649, 650 (2006) (discussing the requirement of automatic conver-
sion in the event of an IPO). For an example of a mandatory-conversion provision, see
Section B.5 of the model Certificate of Incorporation provided by the National Venture
Capital Association. NVCA, CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 29-32, available at http://www.
nvca.org/index.php?option=comContent&view=article&id=108&Itemid=136 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2013).
32 VCs also negotiate for numerous protective provisions that enable them to block a
variety of corporate actions. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 18, at 987. By tightly con-
straining the firm, these provisions give significant leverage to VCs and make it harder for
founders and other common shareholders to resist the VCs' demands to sell the firm.
Staged financing-the ability to withhold needed cash-also gives VCs substantial influ-
ence over corporate decision-making and increases their ability to sell the firm. See id.
33 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(2011).
34 Shareholders, on the other hand, usually cannot initiate fundamental transactions
even when their approval is required to effectuate the transactions. See, e.g., Robert B.
Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in
Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REv. 261, 301-03 (2001) (noting the reactive nature of share-
holder voting to board actions in the takeover context).
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The board, in turn, is elected-and can be replaced-by the
shareholders.3 5 In the typical public company, default statutory vot-
ing rules give the holder of each share one vote for each open board
seat.36 By contrast, in a VC-backed firm, the parties typically negotiate
a voting agreement that overrides default statutory voting rules.37 The
agreement specifies the allocation of board seats among: (1) repre-
sentatives of the common shareholders; (2) representatives of the VC
investors; and (3) so-called "independent" directors, who are mutually
appointed by the common shareholders and the VCs, and typically are
industry experts or other outsiders with valuable experience and
connections.3 8
Because board approval is necessary for VC exits, VCs negotiate
aggressively for board seats when investing in startups.39 While data
on board composition in private, VC-backed firms are scarce, two per-
sistent patterns emerge from various small-scale studies of VC con-
tracting documents and VC-backed firms. First, VC board
representation tends to increase with new financing rounds, especially
outside rounds that bring in new VCs. 40 Second, in a plurality of
firms, neither common shareholders nor VC-appointed directors ever
achieve outright control; the swing vote remains in the hands of an
independent director.41 Keeping the swing vote in the hands of an
independent director makes it more difficult for either the common
shareholders or the preferred shareholders to act opportunistically
with respect to the other class of shareholders. 42 But as one of us has
35 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011).
36 See, e.g., id. § 212(a).
37 William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Con-
trol, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 899 (2002) (describing how venture capital transactions pro-
vide tailored voting arrangements for director elections).
38 See Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 24, at 287-89.
39 VC board control serves other important purposes besides facilitating an exit. It
allows the VCs to monitor the operations of the firm, control entrepreneur opportunism,
replace the entrepreneur with a professional manager should the entrepreneur not prove
up to the task, and prevent the board from taking actions that benefit common sharehold-
ers at the expense of the preferred shareholders. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 18, at
989-93.
40 See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capita4 53 UCLA L. REv. 315, 324
(2005) (studying board control and other exit-related rights in venture capital contracts
and finding an increase in VCs' control over exit with each new round of investment).
41 Cf Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Str6mberg, Should Investors Bet on the
jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Compa-
nies, 64J. FIN. 75, 99-103 (2009) (reporting that by the time of the IPO, the median num-
ber of VC-directors is three, the median number of management directors is two, and the
median number of outside directors is two); Kaplan & Stramberg, supra note 24, at 287-88
(finding that in a survey of 118 startups, neither VCs nor common shareholders had con-
trol in 60% of the startups).
42 See generally Broughman, supra note 30, at 484 (showing that independent directors
serving as tiebreakers can limit opportunistic conduct that may occur if entrepreneurs or
investors were to control the board); Brian Broughman, Independent Directors and Shared
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argued in other work, these studies (and the outwardly neutral ap-
pearance of independent directors) may understate the extent of de
facto VC control over startup boards. 4 3
2. Shareholder Rights
As noted above, for VCs seeking an exit transaction, board ap-
proval is not sufficient. Shareholder approval is also necessary.
As a matter of corporate law, some shareholder approval is always
required. The nature of that approval will depend on the corporate
law of the state in which the firm is domiciled as well as the firm's
charter and other organizational documents. In some states, such as
Delaware, the default arrangement is that a majority of preferred and
common shares (voting together) must approve exit transactions. 4 4
But alternative arrangements, including provisions giving particular
series of preferred stock veto rights, are common.4 5 In other states,
including California, a majority of each class of shares (including com-
mon stock) must approve exit transactions.4 6
As a matter of business practice, the buyer in a trade sale may also
insist on shareholder approvals not required by corporate law or the
firm's organizational documents. For example, a buyer might be con-
cerned about appraisal rights. Under corporate law, dissenting share-
holders in a merger (those voting against the transaction) can
exercise appraisal rights and have a court determine the "fair value" of
their shares; the buyer is then forced to pay fair value to these dissent-
ers. 4 7 If the court's determination of fair value is much higher than
the amount paid per share in the transaction, the cost of acquiring
the target could rise substantially. To minimize potential appraisal
claims, an acquirer may insist that a supermajority of shareholders ap-
Board Control in Venture Finance, 9 REv. L. & ECON. 41 (2013) (providing a formal model of
decision making under shared board control with an independent director holding the
tiebreaking seat).
43 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 18, at 988-89 (noting that (1) at least one director
designated as a representative of the common shareholders will be the CEO, and if the
CEO is an executive hired by the VCs instead of the founder, he or she may be loyal to the
VCs rather than to the common shareholders; and (2) "independent" directors may not be
truly independent of the VCs-even when the directors are approved by both the common
shareholders and VCs-if they are drawn from the VCs' professional network and expect
to interact with the VCs in the future).
44 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2011) (requiring, for a merger, approval by the
holders of majority of outstanding stock).
45 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 18, at 970-71.
46 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (a) (West 2012) (requiring, for a corporate reorganiza-
tion, approval by a majority of each class of outstanding shares).
47 See id. § 1312; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2011).
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prove the transaction.48 The bottom line is that corporate law may
provide only a floor for shareholder-approval requirements.
Because common shareholders' approval is sometimes needed as
a matter of corporate law (in states where approval by each class of
stock is required) or business practice, VCs can (and sometimes do)
negotiate for "drag-along" rights that allow them to force common
shareholders to vote for any transaction favored by the VCs.49 If the
common shareholders have agreed to vote their shares as directed by
the VCs, they cannot block an exit transaction via a class vote.50 In-
stead, they must seek other means to stop the transaction.
II
POTENTIAL ENTREPRENEURIAL-TEAM RESISTANCE TO
TRADE SALES
This Part explores why the entrepreneurial team may resist a
trade sale that the VCs propose. Subpart A explains why founders and
other executives may oppose, and may be able to impede, a trade sale.
Subpart B explains why common shareholders may oppose, and may
be able to impede, a trade sale.
A. Resistance by the Founder and Executives
The founder and other executives may have both reasons and the
means to oppose a trade sale.
1. Incentive
Consider a founder who is still the CEO. The founder-CEO may
have ambitious (perhaps grandiose) financial and nonfinancial aspira-
tions for the startup. He or she may believe that these aspirations can
be realized only if the startup remains independent and he or she
48 Historically, another reason for seeking a high percentage of target shareholder
votes was to obtain favorable accounting treatment for the transaction. See, e.g., Orban v.
Field, No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) (the acquirer of a
VC-backed startup insisted that 90% of the common shareholders approve the acquisition
in order to obtain pooling-of-interests accounting treatment).
49 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 62 n.98 (2006) (describing drag-alongs). Depending on
its terms, the drag-along may not be effective unless the board has also voted to approve
the sale.
50 To the extent that common shareholders have agreed to vote their shares as di-
rected by the VCs, and the shares are voted in favor of a transaction, the common share-
holders may lose their right to appraisal, which is generally available only to shareholders
who vote against the transaction. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2011); cf Corp.
Law Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Enforceability and Effectiveness of
Typical Shareholders Agreement Provisions, 65 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1183-84 (2010) (reporting that,
as of 2010, "[n] either New York nor Delaware courts have explicitly ruled whether a waiver
of appraisal rights in the context of a drag-along sale is enforceable").
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remains in control. A trade sale may well snuff out these aspirations.
To the extent the founder-CEO wants to keep the startup indepen-
dent so that it can realize its full "potential," he or she may oppose a
trade sale.
Whether or not the founder is still part of the management team,
the firm's executives might have two very practical reasons to oppose a
trade sale. First, the executives may well be replaced or subject to
tighter supervision as the firm comes under the control of a single
shareholder (the acquirer). The acquirer could thus force the execu-
tives to give up the pay, perquisites, and prestige associated with their
positions-or to work harder for them.5 1
Second, executives may own substantial amounts of common
stock in the firm, especially if they are part of the founding team. As
we discuss below, a trade sale may yield little for common sharehold-
ers while eliminating the option value of their stock.52 To the extent
executives own common stock that they will be forced to give up for
less than its option value, they have another reason to try to block a
trade sale.
2. Ability
Executives of VC-backed firms seeking to block a trade sale have
three potential means to do so. First, and most importantly, they can
refuse to cooperate in the sale of the firm. They can refuse to report
acquisition interest to the VCs, they can drag their feet in dealing with
a potential acquirer, and they can refuse to provide information or
emphasize negative aspects of the business to a potential acquirer.
Moreover, if a potential acquirer wants members of the executive
team to stay on after the acquisition (for example, to continue devel-
oping a startup's technology), executives can block the deal by refus-
ing to work for the acquirer. In short, executives can use their
positional power in the firm to undermine and sabotage efforts to sell
it.
Second, to the extent executives have seats on the board, they
can threaten to vote against a sale and try to persuade independent
directors to oppose the transaction. Attorneys advising a board may
prefer a vote to be unanimous because it reduces litigation risk. The
51 Executives of VC-backed startups that face potential trade sales are in the same
position as executives of publicly traded companies that face either takeover attempts or
merger proposals. See generally Hartzell, Ofek & Yermack, supra note 22, at 38 (discussing
how executives at target companies experience high turnover rates at the time of acquisi-
tion and during the years immediately proceeding acquisition). Of course, a trade sale
might make the executive team better off in some cases. In those cases, executives would
not oppose the sale.
52 See infra Part II.B.1.
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desire for a unanimous vote would increase the ability of even a single
director to impede a sale.
Third, if common-shareholder approval is necessary for the deal
and executives own a large block of common shares, they can threaten
to vote their shares against the deal and lobby other common share-
holders to oppose the deal. This brings us to common-shareholder
opposition to trade sales.
B. Opposition by Common Shareholders
Common shareholders, like executives, may also have an incen-
tive (and some ability) to impede a trade sale.
1. Incentive
VCs exiting via trade sale can always choose to retain their pre-
ferred shares rather than convert them into common shares. In this
scenario, the VCs have liquidation preferences that must be paid in
full before common shareholders receive any payout. Thus, common
shareholders may not receive much, if anything, in a trade sale. How-
ever, even if the VCs' liquidation preferences exceed the sale price,
the common stock might have considerable option value at the time
of sale: if the firm is not sold now, it might later hit a home run and be
sold later for a price that far exceeds the preferred shareholders' liq-
uidation preferences, giving a large payout to common sharehold-
ers.53 The less common shareholders receive and the greater the loss
of option value, the more common shareholders will wish to block a
trade sale.
In blocking a sale, the common shareholders' goal may not be to
keep the startup independent so that it can later go public. Rather,
these shareholders may resist a trade sale today because they believe
that, if the startup remains independent, there is a good chance that
the future will bring a more attractive trade sale-one that provides
significantly more value for common shareholders.
53 Consider, for example, a startup with $50 million in total liquidation preferences.
Assume there is a 50% likelihood that, within one year, the firm will be worth $90 million
and a 50% likelihood that it will be worth $0. A hypothetical risk-neutral buyer content to
earn a 0% return would pay $45 million for all of the equity of the startup. Preferred
shareholders would get $45 million; common shareholders would get $0. But if the startup
were to remain independent, the common stock would have an expected value of $20
million because there is a 50% likelihood of a $90 million sale yielding $40 million for
common shareholders. This $20 million is the option value of the common stock that is
lost in the sale of the firm today for $45 million.
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2. Ability
Common shareholders can block a trade sale in three ways: by (a)
using their shareholder voting rights; (b) litigating or threatening liti-
gation; or (c) using their influence over the board.
a. Shareholder Voting Rights
As we explained in Part I.B.2, common-shareholder approval may
be necessary to conduct a trade sale. In particular, such approval will
be necessary if (1) corporate law or the acquirer requires common-
shareholder approval, and (2) the VCs fail to negotiate effective drag-
along rights enabling them to force the common shareholders to vote
for a VC-favored sale. If neither corporate law nor the acquirer de-
mands common-shareholder approval (or the VCs have effective drag-
along rights), then common shareholders cannot threaten to hold up
the deal through their voting rights.
b. Fiduciary-Duty and Other Litigation
To try to block a deal, common shareholders can also threaten to
sue the board or the VCs directly for, among other things, breach of
fiduciary duties under corporate law. Common shareholders' litiga-
tion leverage will depend in part on the corporate laws of the state in
which the firm is domiciled. The easier it is to demonstrate a breach
of fiduciary duty under that state's corporate law, the more leverage
common shareholders will have.
But there are two limitations to common shareholders' ability to
credibly threaten litigation. First, aggrieved common shareholders
will often lack the financial ability to sue VCs.5 4 Second, there may
well be large reputational costs to litigating against VCs. 55 All in all,
the actual likelihood of litigation will probably be low.
c. Board Influence
A third mechanism by which common shareholders can impede a
trade sale is by asking their representatives on the board (if there are
any) and any independent directors (if there are any) to vote against
54 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 18, at 1000-01. Lawyers generally will not take such
cases on a contingency basis because the amounts involved in any given case are likely to be
relatively small. The plaintiffs would thus need to finance the potentially extensive litiga-
tion themselves. Defendants, whose litigation will be financed by the target's directors and
officers insurance policies, can be expected to engage in a scorched-earth defense to finan-
cially exhaust the common shareholder plaintiffs. Members of the entrepreneurial team,
even collectively, are unlikely to have the resources necessary to finance such litigation.
55 See id. at 1001. The founders and employees holding common stock may wish to
raise money from VCs in the future for other ventures, or work at other VC-backed
startups. Acquiring a reputation as a "troublemaker" who sues VCs is likely to make it
more difficult to raise funds from VCs or to get positions at VC-backed firms in the future.
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the transaction. Common shareholders will have considerable influ-
ence on how the board votes if a majority of the board's seats are held
by a combination of common-shareholder representatives and inde-
pendent directors. Indeed, given directors' preference for unani-
mous board votes, even a stubborn minority of directors who care
about the interests of common shareholders might be able to block a
sale that is unfavorable to common shareholders.
III
VCs' POTENTIL CARROTS AND STICKS
In Part II, we saw that founders, other executives, and common
shareholders of VC-backed startups may have the incentive and ability
to resist a trade sale. In this Part, we describe the carrots and sticks
that VCs can use to induce founders and other executives (subpart A)
and common shareholders (subpart B) to go along with trade sales.56
Subpart C explains that, from the VCs' perspective, both carrots and
sticks entail costs.
A. Founders and Executives
To induce founders and other executives to facilitate rather than
impede a trade sale, VCs may either offer carrots or deploy various
sticks.
1. Carrots
For founders and other executives, the VCs can use direct carrots
(management bonuses) or indirect carrots (carve-outs to common
shareholders).
a. Management Bonus
The direct carrot is a "management bonus" triggered by the sale
and generally tied to the sale price. The bonus may be structured in a
variety of ways. To begin, executives can be promised ex ante, even
before an acquirer is identified, a portion of the sale proceeds. Alter-
natively, executives can be given a contemporaneously negotiated pay-
ment. This ex post payment might be labeled as a "bonus" or,
56 Because VCs provide financing in stages and have the ability to prevent the firm
from getting debt or equity financing elsewhere, they can always wield the "implicit" stick
of starving the company of cash until management and common shareholders agree to sell
the company. However, use of such a stick might also reduce the value of the VCs' invest-
ment in the firm. In addition, if members of the entrepreneurial team expect to get little
in the sale, the threat of destroying the firm may not induce them to support the sale. For
these two reasons, there are limits to the power of this stick.
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alternatively, characterized as consideration for a noncompete or con-
sulting agreement.57
The cost to VCs of using a management-bonus carrot will depend
on the sale price relative to the aggregate liquidation preferences at
the time of sale. If the sale price exceeds the aggregate liquidation
preferences, the original common shareholders will pay for much (or
all) of the management-bonus carrot. If the sale price is less than the
aggregate liquidation preferences, the VCs will shoulder all of the cost
of the carrot.
b. Carve-Out to Common
The indirect carrot is a carve-out to the common shareholders as
a class. A carve-out entitles common shareholders to a portion of the
proceeds from the trade sale even if the firm is sold for less than the
VCs' liquidation preferences. To the extent that the founders and
executives own shares of common stock, they will share pro rata in the
carve-out. For example, if founders and executives own 50% of the
common stock, a carve-out to common of $10 million will yield foun-
ders and executives $5 million.
2. Sticks
VCs facing recalcitrant founders and other executives have two
potential sticks at their disposal.
a. Termination
First, VCs could threaten to fire the founder and other executives
if they refuse to cooperate in a trade sale. Termination would cut off
future compensation and perhaps cause the forfeiture of unvested eq-
uity. Such a step would be quite painful for the executives.
But such a tactic would also be quite costly for the VCs. The star-
tup would lose its management team, which may be crucial to a poten-
tial buyer; the VCs would be forced to spend time and energy finding
a replacement; and the new team would then need to be brought up
to speed and adequately incentivized to assist in selling the firm. As a
result, we would expect VCs to wield this stick rarely, if at all.
b. Blacklisting
Second, VCs could threaten to blacklist founders and other exec-
utives who refuse to cooperate in a trade sale. VCs are repeat players
in both funding entrepreneurs and hiring professional executives for
57 A retention agreement with the acquiring firm may also function as a carrot if its
actual purpose is to overcome executives' resistance to the sale rather than to increase the
value of the acquirer by binding valuable human capital to the acquiring firm.
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startups. Neither entrepreneurs nor professional managers will want
to displease the VCs, all else being equal.
B. Common Shareholders
To induce common shareholders to support a trade sale, the VCs
have one carrot at their disposal and a number of sticks.
1. Carrot: Carve-Out to Common
The carrot VCs can offer common shareholders is a carve-out
from their liquidation preferences (or other cash-flow rights) so that
common shareholders receive more than they are contractually enti-
tled to receive. Such a carve-out to common can both induce com-
mon shareholders to vote for the sale and cause them to refrain from
suing.
2. Sticks
VCs can wield a number of sticks to compel the class of common
shareholders to vote for the trade sale. However, these sticks cannot
prevent a lawsuit and may in fact increase the likelihood of one.
a. Cross-Voting
To eliminate common shareholders' ability to block a trade sale,
VCs can either partially convert their shares into common stock or
exercise warrants to buy common stock so as to acquire a sufficient
amount of common stock to achieve the necessary approval threshold.
Consider the transactions in Orban v. Field,58 a Delaware case involving
a common-shareholder lawsuit against a VC-controlled board. Office
Mart, a Delaware corporation, arranged to be acquired by Staples in a
merger that provided no payout to its common shareholders.59 The
charter allowed preferred shareholders to vote alongside common
shareholders on an as-converted basis (as if their stock had been con-
verted into common shares), and the preferred shareholders had
enough votes to ensure shareholder approval of the transaction as re-
quired by corporate law.60 However, for accounting reasons, Staples
insisted that at least 90% of Office Mart's common shares be voted in
favor of the transaction. 61 Common shareholders, led by Office
Mart's founder and former CEO George Orban, refused to back the
deal, demanding $4 million in exchange for their votes. 6 2
58 No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
59 See id. at *2.
60 Id. at *6.
61 Id. at *17,
62 Id. at *22.
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Office Mart's board refused to provide a carve-out to common.63
Instead, the board arranged a series of transactions that, in essence,
assisted the VCs in converting a portion of their preferred stock into
common, thereby diluting the original common position down to less
than 10% of the class. 64 The VCs, now holding over 90% of the com-
mon stock, voted their common stock in favor of the merger, which
allowed the transaction to go forward and wiped out the original com-
mon shareholders. The maneuver cost the VCs nothing; although the
partial conversion into common reduced the VCs' aggregate liquida-
tion preferences, it still left them with enough liquidation preferences
to absorb all of the merger consideration. Orban sued, arguing that
Office Mart's board had violated its fiduciary duties to common share-
holders. The Delaware Chancery ruled in favor of the board, conclud-
ing that the "common stockholders had no legal right to a portion of
the merger consideration under Delaware law or the corporate char-
ter"65 and noting that "[t] here is no claim" that the challenged trans-
action "was not in the best interests of the corporation." 6 6
b. Vote Buying
VCs can also overcome common-shareholder opposition by buy-
ing the votes of shareholders, such as executives, who already own a
large block of common stock. For instance, assume that three execu-
tives of a startup collectively hold 55% of the common stock and that a
trade sale cannot occur without approval by 50% of the common
shareholders. Rather than providing a carve-out to all common share-
holders, the VCs could simply award each of these three individuals a
lucrative cash bonus or other payment in connection with a trade sale
in exchange (implicitly) for voting their common shares in favor of
the transaction. Vote buying via payments to executives can thus kill
two birds-executive opposition to the trade sale and common-share-
holder opposition to the trade sale-with one stone.
Alternatively, a VC-controlled board can issue (additional) com-
mon shares to certain executives or employees who expect to gain
from the board's proposed transaction and will thus vote their com-
mon shares in favor of the transaction.67 Although vote buying in
63 Id. at *21.
64 Id. at *22-24.
65 Id. at *32. Of course, the issue here was not, as the court implies, how to divide the
proceeds of an already-effected merger. In fact, the merger had not yet taken place.
Rather, the issue was whether a preferred-controlled board could use corporate resources
to dilute the voting power of common shareholders objecting to a proposed merger that
benefitted the preferred shareholders and left the common shareholders with nothing. Id.
at *2-3.
66 Id. at *8 n.23.
67 For example, the plaintiffs bringing suit in Kalashian v. Advent VI L.P., No. CV-
739278, 1996 WL 33399950 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 1996) alleged-among
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some or all of these cases may violate the board's duty to refrain from
improperly tampering with the shareholder vote,68 it is very difficult to
prove that the purpose of a particular payment or equity issuance to
executives or employees is to buy votes.
C. Carrots vs. Sticks
We have seen that VCs have at their disposal both carrots and
sticks to induce entrepreneurial teams to cooperate in trade sales.
Carrots tend to involve out-of-pocket costs. For example, carve-outs to
common come solely at the VCs' expense.69 But many sticks, such as
threats to terminate or blacklist a founder or other executives, do not
involve any cash outlay.70
However, sticks can give rise to substantial indirect costs. First,
although litigation is unlikely in any given case, the use of sticks may
well increase the risk of litigation, which, should it occur, can be very
costly in terms of VCs' time and reputation.7' Second, VCs may be
deterred from "misbehaving" because of reputational considera-
other things-that the VCs had given common stock to new management solely to under-
mine the voting power of the original common shareholders for the purpose of preventing
these shareholders from blocking an economically dilutive financing. After trial, the VCs
ended up settling for $15 million. See Kenton J. King, Warning: Rescue May Risk Risks, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at 20.
68 See Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 67 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citing Schreiber
v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25-26 (Del. Ch. 1982) for the proposition that vote buying, where
the purpose is to defraud or in some way disenfranchise other shareholders, is per se
illegal).
69 Management bonuses would come solely at the expense of the VCs if the firm were
sold for an amount less than total liquidation preferences. However, if the firm were sold
for an amount greater than total liquidation preferences, management bonuses would be
subsidized by the common shareholders, either partially (if VCs have participating pre-
ferred stock) or completely (if VCs have nonparticipating preferred stock).
70 Vote buying and cross-voting may or may not require dipping into the VCs' pock-
ets. First, consider vote buying. Vote buying can occur completely at the expense of the
common shareholders if value the original common shareholders would otherwise (absent
the vote buying) have received is used to pay for the votes. For example, suppose that
absent vote buying, common shareholders as a class would receive $5 million in a sale and
a majority of the common shareholders would oppose such a sale. The VCs then pay exec-
utives a net amount of $4 million to exercise underwater options to acquire (on a post-
exercise basis) 50% of the outstanding common shares and vote their shares in favor of the
transaction. Common shareholders as a class now receive $1 million, with 50% of that $1
million going to the executives.
Next, consider cross-voting. Cross-voting can often occur with no out-of-pocket cost to
VCs. Suppose, for example, that VCs' liquidation preferences are $50 million and the sale
price is $40 million. The VCs can convert 20% of their shares into common stock and vote
these common shares in favor of the sale without reducing the value of their liquidation
preferences and their payout in the sale.
71 See Vladimir Atanasov, Vladimir Ivanov & Kate Litvak, Does Reputation Limit Opportu-
nistic Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence from Litigation Against VCs, 67 J. FIN. 2215,
2226-27, 2244 (2012).
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tions.72 As websites like TheFunded.com make the world smaller and
more transparent, and serial entrepreneurs play a more important
role in startups, the reputational costs to VCs who bully en-
trepreneurial teams with sticks are likely to become higher. Thus,
both carrots and sticks can be costly to VCs.
IV
RESEARCH SAMPLE
A. Sample Population
We study the use of carrots and sticks in trade sales of VC-backed
startups using a hand-collected data set of VC-backed Silicon Valley
firms. This section describes the data-collection process and provides
descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample.
1. Data Gathering
The data used for this project were collected in 2005-2007 as part
of a study supported by the Kaufmann Foundation and the University
of California, Berkeley. We obtained from VentureReporter.net a list
of VC-financed companies located in California that were sold in
trade sales in either 2003 or 2004. We filtered out all firms except
those located in and around San Francisco, San Jose, and Oakland
(broadly defined as "Silicon Valley"), 73 leaving a population of 193
firms.
For each firm, we next sought to locate and obtain data from one
or more persons knowledgeable about the firm's life-including the
circumstances surrounding its sale. We identified the current busi-
ness addresses for the founders and executives-all of whom we call
"entrepreneurs" for convenience-of 141 of the 193 companies. We
mailed letters asking entrepreneurs from each firm to provide us with
data, promising to keep confidential the identity of the entrepreneur
and the startup firm.
Entrepreneurs from 57 of the 141 firms agreed to provide us with
data-a response rate of 40.4%. The information obtained, supple-
mented by publicly filed corporate charters, covered each firm's en-
tire life span. Among the data gathered were the state of
72 See Black & Gilson, supra note 9, at 262-63 (arguing that geographical proximity
between VCs and investment portfolio companies gives rise to reputational constraints,
deterring opportunistic acts by VCs); Sahlman, supra note 4, at 513 (arguing that VCs re-
frain from abusing their power because they wish to attract the best entrepreneurs, who
could always obtain funding from other VCs or alternative sources of capital).
73 We used LinkSV to filter out firms that did not meet these criteria. See LINKSV,
http://www.linksv.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). LinkSV profiles all companies located in
Silicon Valley (in or around San Jose, San Francisco, and Oakland) that receive venture
capital funding. Companies that did not appear on LinkSV were removed from our
sample.
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incorporation; cash-flow rights and control rights negotiated in each
VC financing round; the identities and backgrounds of the CEO and
directors; and the circumstances and terms of the sale, including
amounts paid to management and various classes of shareholders.
From the original set of 57 firms, we removed seven for lack of
adequate data, leaving us with 50 firms. In most of these sales (42 out
of 50), the VCs exited as preferred shareholders. In the remaining
eight firms, the VCs converted into common stock in connection with
the sale, giving up their liquidation preferences.
2. Selection Issues
Because our sample is limited to Silicon Valley firms sold in 2003
or 2004, one must be somewhat cautious about extrapolating from
our firms to VC-backed firms generally. Silicon Valley is a close-knit
community with its own norms and ways of doing business.74 Our
sample firms were sold several years after the tech bubble collapsed, a
period in which VCs lost considerable amounts of money.75 These
losses may have heightened the conflicts between VCs and en-
trepreneurial teams around exit events. The use of carrots and sticks
within our sample firms could thus be a function of the post-bubble
time period and factors unique to Silicon Valley, limiting the general-
izability of our results.7 6
74 See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and
the Suppression of Business Disputes in the Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 679, 699-702
(1996) (observing that because of Silicon Valley's unique environment, lawyers take on an
expanded role of helping to familiarize inexperienced entrepreneurs with local norms and
business conventions).
75 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Dot-Com Crash Catches Up with Venture Capitalists, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010, 5:07 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/dot-
com-crash-catch-up-with-venture-capitalists (noting that the dramatic drop in ten-year re-
turns for venture capital investments between the periods ending in 2008 and 2009 re-
flected big losses during the dot-com crash).
76 In addition, our sample consists only of companies whose entrepreneurs volunta-
rily responded to our request for information. There could be systematic differences be-
tween firms whose entrepreneurs responded to our inquiries and firms whose
entrepreneurs did not. While we sought to minimize such biases by soliciting data from
every entrepreneur we could locate and by offering confidentiality, our sample might not
even be completely representative of Silicon Valley firms sold in 2003 and 2004. One rea-
son to think that our sample might be unrepresentative, for example, is the higher inci-
dence of litigation in sample firms compared to other firms. Among the 50 sample firms,
there were three lawsuits filed by founders against VC investors, a litigation rate of approxi-
mately 6%. (Two of these lawsuits related to the sale of the firm; one did not. For confi-
dentiality reasons, we cannot disclose any additional information about these lawsuits.)
Among the 143 out-of-sample firms, there was only one founder who filed a lawsuit against
VC investors, a litigation rate of less than 1%. This suggests that the frequency of sticks
outside our sample might be lower than the frequency of sticks in our sample.
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B. Sample Description
Our sample firms are "high-tech" businesses, primarily in the bi-
otech, software, telecommunications, and internet sectors (Panel A of
Table 1). The concentration of IT-related businesses is representative
of VC-financed firms generally.77 At the time of sale, the firms had
received an average of $42 million in VC funding and had been oper-
ating for an average of approximately five years. The mean sale price
is $55 million. Panel B of Table 1 provides information on the
amount invested, financing rounds, years of operation, and sale price.
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND LIQUIDATION PREFERENCES
This table provides descriptive statistics for our 50 sample firms. Panel A reports in-
dustry classification for each firm as provided by www.linksv.com. Panel B reports the
mean and median period of operation, number of financing rounds, amount in-
vested, and sale price. Panel B also shows the aggregate liquidation preferences (LPs)
of VC investors at the time of sale. Panel C shows the preferences given in each round
of financing. The first column lists, for each round, the number of firms granting lx
LPs. The second column lists, for each round, the number of firms granting LPs
between lx and 2x. The third column lists, for each round, the number of firms
granting LPs greater than 2x. The final column lists financing rounds where the LPs
of earlier investors are waived or reduced (a "recap" financing). Panel D shows, at the
time of sale, the relationship between aggregate LPs and the sale price.
PANEL A: INDusTRY DismIBurION OF SAMPLE FRMs
Sector
Biotech Telecom Software Internet Other IT
6 13 12 10 9
PANEL B: FINANCING OVERVIEW
Mean Median SD
Years of operation 5.1 5 1.6
Number of financing rounds 3.0 3 1.1
Amount invested (millions $) 42.2 31 36.7
Sale price (millions $) 55.0 24.3 103.9
Aggregate LPs (millions $) 46.9 33.5 38.9
77 See Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 24, at 284.
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PANEL C: LIQUIDATION PREFERENCES (LPs)
lx <;2x >2x Recap
1st round (n=50) 46 2 2 0
2nd round (n=39) 25 10 3 1
3rd round (n=24) 15 2 2 5
4th round (n=10) 2 2 2 4
5th round (n=5) 1 1 0 3
PANEL D: RELATION OF AGGREGATE LIQUIDATION PREFERENCES TO SALE PRICE
LP > sale price LP < sale price
31 19
C. VCs' Ex Ante Cash and Control Rights
We now turn to describe, for each of the firms in our sample, (1)
the VCs' cash-flow rights; (2) the entrepreneurial team's board seats
and shareholder voting rights; and (3) the identity of the CEO at the
time of sale.
1. VCs' Cash-Fow Rights
Across all 50 firms, VCs' aggregate liquidation preferences at the
time of sale are, on average, $47 million. In the first round of financ-
ing, the liquidation preference usually equals the amount invested (a
"lx preference"), while the liquidation preference in subsequent
rounds is more likely to be a higher multiple (i.e., 2x or 3x) of the
amount invested (Panel C).78 At sale, aggregate liquidation prefer-
ences are on average somewhat greater than the amount invested
(Panel B).
When VCs retain their preferred stock rather than converting to
common stock, the allocation of the sale proceeds depends on the
relationship between liquidation preferences and the sale price. If liq-
uidation preferences exceed the sale price and contractual priority is
fully respected, common shareholders get nothing. Liquidation pref-
erences exceed the sale price in 31 of the 42 firms in which VCs exit as
preferred shareholders (Panel D). Absent a carrot, common share-
holders as a class have little incentive to approve a merger when their
equity is underwater. In eight firms, it was in the VCs' interest to con-
vert to common stock rather than maintain their liquidation prefer-
ences, meaning that the sale proceeds were allocated pro rata among
78 Liquidation preferences from early rounds of financing are sometimes waived or
otherwise reduced in a subsequent round of financing (a "recap" financing). A recap fi-
nancing may occur as part of a voluntary recapitalization of the firm, perhaps to eliminate
"debt" overhang from relatively large liquidation preferences, or alternatively, a pay-to-play
contractual provision may force a VC to convert to common stock (and thereby give up its
preferences) if it fails to participate in a subsequent financing round. In our sample of 50
firms, there were 13 recap financing rounds (Panel C).
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all common shareholders (the original common shareholders and the
converting VCs).
2. Power of the Entrepreneurial Team
This section describes the extent of the entrepreneurial teams'
blocking power-their board seats and corporate-law rights-in our
sample firms. The data are summarized in Table 2.
a. Board Seats
Recall that board approval is required for a trade sale. Thus, the
entrepreneurial team may be able to impede a sale through its influ-
ence on the board. We divide directors into three categories: (1) VC
appointed, (2) common-shareholder appointed, and (3) independent
(outside). If a particular outside director had been selected exclu-
sively by either the VCs or the common shareholders, we designate
this person as a VC or common-shareholder director, regardless of
how contracting documents label the board seat.7 9
Panel A reports the allocation of board seats. At the time of sale,
56.5% of all directors were appointed by the VCs, and 22.8% were
appointed by the common shareholders. Panel B shows that the VCs
controlled the board in 29 of the 50 firms (58%). In our sample,
common shareholders rarely controlled the board at the time of the
sale (3 of the 50 firms). However, in 21 of the 50 firms, the combina-
tion of independent directors and common shareholders could have
blocked a sale.
TABLE 2: CONTROL RIGHTS
This table reports the distribution of corporate governance rights in our sample firms.
Panel A reports the mean and median board representation for (1) common share-
holders, (2) VCs, and (3) independent (outside) directors. Panel B shows board con-
trol at the time of sale. If the VCs (or common shareholders) control a majority of
the board seats, we classify the VCs (or common shareholders) as having "Control." If
the board has an even number of seats and the VCs (or common shareholders) ap-
point exactly half the directors, we treat this as "Blocking." "Shared Control" means
that the VCs and the common shareholder each appoint fewer than 50% of the direc-
tors, with outside directors providing the tie-breaking vote. Panel C shows the state of
incorporation at the time of sale.
79 Our "de facto" classification of directors differs from the "formal" classification
used by Kaplan and Stramberg in their 2003 study, which treats any board seat intended
for a director who is not a VC or a representative of the common shareholders as held by
an outside director. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 24, at 287. As one of us has ex-
plained elsewhere, nominally independent directors may not be truly independent
tiebreakers between the VCs and the common shareholders. See Fried & Ganor, supra note
18, at 988-89.
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PANEL A: BOARD SEATS AT TIME OF SALE
Mean Median SD
Total number of board seats 5.74 5 1.52
Common seats (% of board) 22.8% 20.0% 0.137
VC seats (% of board) 56.5% 57.1% 0.172
Outsider seats (% of board) 20.7% 20.0% 0.185
PANEL B: DISTRIBUTION OF BOARD CONTROL
Common Common Shared VC VC
Control Blocking Control Blocking Control
Board Control (n=50) 3 0 12 6 29
PANEL C: STATE OF INCORPORATION
Delaware California Other
State of incorporation at time of sale 35 15 0
b. Shareholder Rights
All our companies were incorporated in either California or Dela-
ware at the time of their sales, consistent with findings that most VC-
backed firms incorporate either in their home state or in Delaware.80
Panel C shows that 35 out of 50 firms were incorporated in Delaware
at the time of the sale. As we explain below, California law may give
the entrepreneurial team somewhat more power vis-i-vis VCs through
both voting rights and the threat of fiduciary litigation.
(1) Voting rights. California and Delaware provide different voting
rights for shareholders. In Delaware, mergers typically need to be ap-
proved by only the holders of a majority of all of the firm's outstand-
ing stock, both preferred and common.81 We find that at the time of
sale, VCs almost always have sufficient voting power to dictate the out-
come of a shareholder-wide vote.82 California, on the other hand, re-
quires a separate vote for each class of shareholders.83 Thus, when
the VCs remain preferred shareholders, common shareholders of
firms domiciled in California can more easily impede a sale they
oppose.
But it is not that simple. California purports to subject "quasi-
California" corporations (corporations doing business in California
but incorporated elsewhere) to the requirement of separate class
80 See Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lin-
gua Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups 25 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 12-
38), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117967.
81 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2011).
82 Our findings are consistent with Kaplan and Str6mberg's findings in their 2003
study. See Kaplan and Str6mberg, supra note 24, at 295.
83 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a) (West 2012).
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votes. 4 While California's legal ability to impose this requirement on
firms incorporated elsewhere is contested, many (but not all) Dela-
ware-incorporated companies located in California are advised by law-
yers to hold separate class votes. In our sample, all but one Delaware-
incorporated firm held a separate class vote for the common
shareholders.
Thus, as a practical matter, incorporation in California rather
than in Delaware may not give common shareholders much more
power through voting rights. Nevertheless, common shareholders'
ability to impede a transaction is still likely to be somewhat greater in
a California-incorporated firm, where a separate class vote is indispu-
tably mandatory.85
(2) Fiduciary litigation. During the years in which our sample firms
were sold, Delaware law appeared to permit a VC-controlled board to
make decisions that favor preferred shareholders at the expense of
the common shareholders unless the common shareholders could
show that the decision was not in the "best interests of the corpora-
tion."8 6 In contrast, California law generally affords stronger protec-
tion to minority shareholders, including common shareholders in
firms with VC-controlled boards.87  Thus, directors of California-
domiciled firms may have believed they faced greater risk of liability
for harming common shareholders.88
84 See id. § 2115(b).
85 As noted earlier, if the common shareholders have subjected themselves to
drag-along rights, they cannot use their voting rights to block a sale. Three entrepreneurs
in our sample (two California-domiciled firms, one Delaware-domiciled firm) indicated
that drag-along rights limited their ability to vote against a trade sale. We have been told
by venture capital lawyers that drag-along rights are now used much more frequently, espe-
cially in deals involving East Coast venture capital firms.
86 See Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *29-32 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1,
1997). However, a recent decision by Vice Chancellor Laster clarifies that a board con-
trolled by preferred shareholders must do more than act in the "best interests of the corpo-
ration"; in particular, directors must "pursue the best interests of the corporation and its
common stockholders.. . ." In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-VCL, 2013 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 207, at *63 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013) (quoting LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v.
James, 990 A.2d 435, 452 (Del. Ch. 2010)).
87 Cf Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969) (holding that
majority shareholders have a fiduciary responsibility to minority shareholders to use their
ability to control the corporation in a fair, just, and equitable manner); DiLillo v. Ustman
Techs., Inc., No. B148198, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1527 (Nov. 19, 2001) (determin-
ing that a VC was a controlling shareholder of a firm and that plaintiff common sharehold-
ers could sue the VC directly for breach of a fiduciary duty in connection with the sale of
the firm's assets).
88 However, a quirky feature of California corporate law may make it difficult for com-
mon shareholders to prevail against VCs on corporate-law claims when the VCs exit via a
merger. Under California law, a firm's insiders have been permitted to eliminate personal
liability for violations of corporate law by conducting a merger with an unrelated entity;
once the firm has merged, shareholders' only remedy for corporate law violations, even for
alleged fiduciary violations that occurred prior to merger, is appraisal. See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1312 (West 2012); Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683, 693-94 (Cal. 1986).
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3. Founders' Position in the Firm
The entrepreneurial team is likely to have a greater incentive to
block a trade sale if the founder is still the CEO. First, a founder-CEO
is likely to own more common stock than a replacement CEO; every-
thing else equal, he or she will thus face a greater loss of option value
if the firm is sold. Second, a founder-CEO may derive greater nonfi-
nancial benefits from the business and thus may have additional in-
centive to keep the firm independent.
The entrepreneurial team may also have greater ability to impede
a sale if the founder is still the CEO. A founder-CEO is likely to have
substantially more common stock than a hired CEO, giving him more
shareholder-blocking power. Compared to a hired CEO, the founder-
CEO is also likely to have longer and deeper relationships with other
directors and common shareholders. As a result, the founder-CEO is
likely to have influence over directors and other common sharehold-
ers, increasing the likelihood that directors will resist the trade sale
and further increasing the likelihood that common shareholders will
vote against the transaction.
To reduce resistance to a trade sale, a firm's VC investors may use
their control over the board of directors to replace the CEO before
the planned exit. In our 50-firm sample, 29 of the founders (58%)
were replaced as CEOs before the firm was sold. However, as we will
discuss shortly, none of these replacements appeared to be made to
overcome resistance to a trade sale.
V
ACTUAL CARROTS AND STICKS IN THE SALE OF
VC-BACKED STARTUPS
Part III described the potential carrots and sticks that VCs could
deploy to induce entrepreneurial teams to sell the firm. Here, we de-
scribe the actual carrots (subpart A) and sticks (subpart B) used in
our sample. We also describe the total out-of-pocket cost to the VCs in
our sample of using carrots in connection with trade sales.
Delaware law, which is generally considered to be more insider friendly, does not shield
insiders in this manner during ordinary mergers. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2011);
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Del. 1985) (holding that
courts should examine allegations of "specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other
items of misconduct" in connection with a merger even if appraisal is available to plaintiffs
as a remedy). Thus, if a California court today were to follow Steinberg, common-share-
holder plaintiffs would be worse off, in some respects, than if the firm had been subject to
Delaware corporate law.
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A. Carrots
1. Common Carve-Outs
In our sample, 11 sales (22% of 50 sales) feature carve-outs to
common shareholders-extra value above the amount to which they
were contractually entitled. To measure these carve-outs, we compare
the actual payout received by VCs to the VCs' contractual entitlement.
When VCs convert their preferred shares to common shares, their
contractual entitlement equals their pro rata share of the sale price.
When VCs exit as preferred shareholders, their contractual entitle-
ment is the lesser of their liquidation preferences and the sale price.89
Any excess payment received by the original common shareholders is
treated as a carve-out to common.
Table 3 describes the carve-outs to common shareholders in our
sample. Limited to the 11 sales in which a carve-out occurs, the aver-
age carve-out to common shareholders is $3.7 million, or approxi-
mately 10% of the total sale price. Though most firms do not provide
a carve-out, carve-outs can be substantial when they occur. In our
sample, one sale provided a $10 million carve-out to common share-
holders, and in two deals, the carve-out was at least 25% of the total
sale price.
Carve-outs to common shareholders occur only in the 42 firms
where the VCs exit holding preferred stock. Limited to the subsample
of 42 firms where VC investors did not convert their preferred shares
to common shares, we find that common shareholders receive, on av-
erage, $969,000 more than their contractual entitlement, or approxi-
mately 2.5% of the total sale price. Among all 50 companies, common
shareholders receive, on average, $810,000 more than their contrac-
tual entitlement, or approximately 2.2% of the total sale price.
Carve-outs to common shareholders are illustrated in Figure 1.
Each bar represents a firm's total sale price (in millions of dollars).
The sale price is divided into four components: (1) the amount actu-
ally paid to VCs (in black); (2) the contractual entitlement of the orig-
inal common shareholders at the given sale price (in white); (3) the
carve-out given to the original common shareholders (in dark grey);
and (4) nonretention bonuses paid to senior management in connec-
tion with the sale (in light grey).
89 The sale price is defined as the amounts paid to VCs and common shareholders.
In those cases where (a) the sale price exceeds the liquidation preferences and (b) the VCs
exit holding participating preferred stock, we define VCs' cash-flow rights as the sum of the
liquidation preferences and the participation rights.
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FIGURE 1.
This figure shows, for each firm, the distribution of exit proceeds among VCs, com-
mon shareholders, and senior management. Each bar represents a firm's total sale
price (in millions of dollars). The sale price is divided into four components: (1) the
amount actually paid to VCs (in black); (2) the contractual entitlement of the original
common shareholders (in white); (3) the carve-out given to the original common
shareholders (in dark grey), and (4) non-retention bonuses paid to senior manage-
ment in connection with the sale (in light grey). For ease of presentation, all firms
with a sale price of more than $100 million are normalized to a sale price of $100
million.
Distribution of Sale Proceeds for Each Firm
Payout to Preferred Stock
Contractual Entitlement of Common Stock
Carve-Out to Common
Management Bonus
TABLE 3: CARROTS
This table describes the frequency and magnitude of carve-outs to common and man-
agement bonuses in our sample firms. Panel A provides summary statistics for all
sample firms. Panel B reports summary statistics only for those firms that provided a
carve-out to common and/or a management bonus. Data are presented in millions of
dollars and as a percentage of the sale price. The included summary statistics are
mean, dollar-weighted mean (DW Mean), standard deviation (SD), minimum, and
maximum. DW Mean is weighted by the firm's sale price.
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PANEL A
DW
All Sample Firms # obs. Mean Mean SD Min. Max
Common carve-out (millions $) 50 0.81 - 2.20 0 10
Management bonus (millions $) 50 0.52 - 1.17 0 6
Combined carrot (millions $) 50 1.33 - 2.63 0 10.31
Common carve-out (% of sale price) 50 2.2% 1.47% .058 0 26.7%
Management bonus (% of sale price) 50 2.1% 0.95% .039 0 16.7%
Combined carrot (% of sale price) 50 4.3% 2.42% .078 0 43.3%
PANEL B
Firms with Common Carve-out and/ DW
or Management Bonus # obs. Mean Mean SD Min. Max
Common carve-out (millions $) 11 3.67 - 3.18 .03 10
Management bonus (millions $) 16 1.63 - 1.61 .1 6
Combined carrot (millions $) 23 2.89 - 3.27 .03 10.31
Common carve-out (% of sale price) 11 10.1% 8.91% .088 1% 26.7%
Management bonus (% of sale price) 16 6.6% 6.19% .041 1.8% 16.7%
Combined carrot (% of sale price) 23 9.4% 9.19% .093 1% 43.3%
In our sample, common carve-outs are used, at least in part, to
overcome common shareholders' opposition to trade sales. Else-
where, we showed econometrically that these carve-outs are more
likely to occur when: (1) VCs lack de facto board control and thus
need to convince other directors-such as independent directors and
common-appointed directors-to support the sale; (2) the firm is
domiciled in California rather than Delaware, and therefore common
shareholders' rights are likely to be slightly stronger; or (3) common
shareholders would otherwise be wiped out and receive none of the
sale proceeds.90
Qualitative interview data confirm that carve-outs to common
shareholders are designed to induce common shareholders and their
allies on the board to support the sale. In one California-domiciled
firm, for example, the VCs carving out a portion of their liquidation
preferences for common shareholders required each common share-
holder to sign a liability waiver before receiving a portion of the carve-
out. According to the entrepreneur, the carve-out was offered only
because the VCs were concerned about a possible common-share-
holder suit challenging the terms of the sale. In another case, where
the VCs lacked board control, the entrepreneur told us that the VCs
were forced to give a carve-out payment to common shareholders to
obtain the support of other directors.
90 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 394.
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Of course, some of the carve-outs to common might have had
other motives. VCs might have wanted to be "fair" to common share-
holders or to build or maintain a reputation as "friendly" VCs. How-
ever, the fact that these carve-outs are more likely to occur when
common shareholders have more power or more incentive to block a
sale suggests that they are being used at least in part to induce com-
mon shareholders' cooperation with sales.
2. (Nonretention) Management Bonuses
Bonuses that do not require management to stay with the ac-
quirer might be used as carrots to induce executives to support a
sale.91 Of the 50 firms in our sample, 16 offered various nonretention
management bonuses in connection with the acquisition, with an av-
erage bonus in these 16 firms of $1.63 million (or 6.6% of the sale
price). Bonuses are sometimes given to a broad class of employees (5
firms), but in most cases they are limited to key executives (11 firms).
Among all 50 companies, senior executives receive an average
nonretention bonus of approximately $520,000. Across all compa-
nies, these payments represent approximately 2.1% of the total
purchase price (or 0.95% on a dollar-weighted basis).*92 Compared to
bonuses awarded in connection with the sale of publicly held firms,
the payments we document are modest in dollar terms, but large as a
fraction of deal size.9 3 Nonretention management bonuses are de-
picted in Figure 1.
Of course, VCs might have other reasons to give executives a
management bonus besides inducing them to sell the company. They
may want to reward the executives for ajob well done or to curry favor
with executives whom they hope to hire in the future. Thus, we can-
not be certain that all of the nonretention bonuses observed were sale-
related carrots.
91 Retention arrangements-arrangements that require executives to stay with the ac-
quirer-might be used either as (1) arm's-length deals by the acquirer to keep the target's
talent or (2) carrots by the VCs to induce executives to support the deal. In our sample, 19
founders reported that retention agreements or related compensation arrangements (such
as options for the acquirer stock) were negotiated in connection with the sale. Because we
were not given any reason to believe that these arrangements were designed to serve as
carrots, and because their value is difficult to measure, we report data only on nonreten-
tion bonuses.
92 Most of these payments came at the expense of the VCs. Across the 50 firms in our
sample, a total of $26 million was paid out in the form of nonretention management bo-
nuses. Of this amount, $22.5 million came at the expense of preferred shareholders, and
only $3.5 million came at the expense of common shareholders.
93 See Hartzell, Ofek & Yermack, supra note 22, at 43-46 (finding that on average,
CEOs of publicly held target firms receive a nonretention merger bonus worth approxi-
mately $1.2 million, which is only about 0.1% of the average acquisition price-$1.2 bil-
lion-of the deals in the study).
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3. Cost of Carrots
In our sample, 23 of the 50 firms offer a management bonus or
common carve-out. Limited to the group of 23 firms offering a carrot,
Figure 2 illustrates the value of these benefits relative to the sale price.
In most cases, total carrots represent between 5% and 12% of the sale
price, with a mean amount of approximately $2.9 million (or 9.4% of
deal value) (Table 3). In two firms, however, total carrots exceed 20%
of deal value.
Across all 50 firms, the total cost of carrots (those given to execu-
tives plus those given to common shareholders) is about $1.33 million
for the average sample firm (Table 3). Across all companies, the aver-
age carrot is approximately 4.3% of the purchase price (or 2.4% on a
dollar-weighted basis).94
FIGURE 2.
This figure shows, for each of the 23 firms in our sample that provided a common
carve-out or management bonus, the payouts as a percentage of the total sale price.
Carve-outs to common are shown in dark grey, and management bonuses are shown
in light grey.
Carve-Outs to Common and Management Bonuses as a Percentage of Sale Price
U
(U
Firms offering Management Bonus and/or Carve-Out to Common Stock
Carve-Out to Common Stock (%)
Management Bonus (%)
The use of carrots is greater in the 42 firms in our sample where
the VC investors did not convert to common stock, and thus where
the conflict between the entrepreneurial team and VCs was likely to
be the greatest. In this subsample of 42 firms we find that the total
94 On average, preferred shareholders bore $1.26 million of the cost and common
shareholders bore the remaining $70,000.
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cost of carrots is about $1.51 million for the average firm and that
approximately 5.0% of deal value (3.1% on a dollar-weighted basis)
was used to fund carrots.
B. Sticks
As explained earlier, the two potential sticks available to VCs in
dealing with recalcitrant executives are firing them and threatening to
blacklist them, and the two sticks that can be used against common
shareholders are cross-voting and vote buying. This section describes
the use of such sticks in our sample.
1. Termination of CEO
Recall that 29 of the 50 founders of our firms had been replaced
before the sale. But these replacements typically occurred well before
the sale, usually in connection with a later round of financing. 95 After
three years of operating, approximately 30% of the firms in our sam-
ple had replaced the founder-CEO. Of those firms still in operation
after six years, approximately 63% of the firms had replaced the
founder-CEO. 96 Data on the timing of CEO replacement in our sam-
ple are summarized in Table 4.
TABLE 4: THE CEO POsITION
Table 4 reports the identity of the CEO in our sample firms (founder or replace-
ment), as of the end of each year of the firm's operation. Panel B illustrates the
frequency of CEO replacement over time. The horizontal axis represents the life
span of each firm from formation to sale, normalized to one unit, and the vertical axis
represents the percentage of sample firms that have replaced the CEO.
95 In 3 of the 29 firms where the founder was replaced as CEO, the founder-CEO was
replaced in connection with the first round of VC financing (meaning the founder agreed
to resign as CEO in exchange for the financing). In the other 26 firms, the founder-CEO
was replaced at a later date, typically after several rounds of financing.
96 Our evidence regarding the timing of CEO replacement is roughly consistent with
Michael T. Hannan, M. Diane Burton, and James N. Baron, Inertia and Change in the Early
Years: Employment Relations in Young, High Technology Firms, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 503,
525-26 (1996) (finding that the likelihood that a nonfounder will be appointed CEO is
about 10% in the first 20 months of a company's life, 40% after 40 months, and 80% after
80 months).
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PANEL A
Year Obs. Founder CEO Replacement CEO
1 50 47 94% 3 6%
2 50 42 84% 8 16%
3 48 34 71% 14 29%
4 42 26 62% 16 38%
5 31 13 42% 18 58%
6 19 7 37% 12 63%
7 11 3 27% 8 73%
8 5 2 40% 3 60%
9+ 3 1 33% 2 67%
PANEL B
Replacement CEO (Non-Founder)
formation 25% 50% 75% sale
Percentage of Firm Life
In fact, none of the entrepreneurs providing us with data indi-
cated that any founder (or other executive) was fired or threatened
with being fired immediately in connection with a contemplated sale.
Moreover, while the impetus for replacing the founder-CEO typically
came from the VCs, there was little conflict over the replacement of
the founder-CEO. 97 None of the terminated founder-CEOs reported
that the VCs had caused the firm to repurchase vested options or had
97 For more background on CEO replacement in startup firms, see the discussion in
Brian Broughman, Investor Opportunism, and Governance in Venture Capita4 in VE.NTuRE CAPI-
TAL: INvEsmrNT STRATEGIEs, STRucruR.Es, AND PoucrEs 347, 355-57 (Douglas J. Cumming
ed., 2010).
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fired the founder-CEO to strip him or her of unvested equity, a possi-
bility raised by Michael Klausner and Kate Litvak.98
Indeed, most of the replaced founders reported significant in-
volvement with the firm after the CEO change. The founder-CEO re-
mained on the board following the CEO replacement in almost 60%
(17 out of 29) of our sample firms. Even when the founder does not
keep a board seat, he or she generally has some position with the firm
after replacement (often serving as the Chief Technology Officer or
in some other executive capacity).
To be sure, even if we do not observe forcible termination, the
possibility of such termination is always present. The possibility of ter-
mination limits the value of management bonuses that executives can
extract from the VCs.
2. Blacklisting
In two firms (Firm 35 and Firm 50), VCs explicitly threatened to
prevent a founder from ever raising money again in Silicon Valley if
he or she did not vote for the sale as a director. In each of these firms,
the founder's support was not necessary as a matter of corporate law
to conduct the sale-the VCs had control of the board-but the VCs
wanted a unanimous board vote to reduce liability risk. And they got
it in both situations.
Again, the fact that blacklisting was explicitly threatened in only
two firms does not mean that founders or executives in other firms
were not affected by the possibility of blacklisting. We have been told
by VCs and venture capital lawyers that entrepreneurs are keenly
aware, even if they have not been explicitly told, that if they behave
"unreasonably" toward the VCs backing their firm, it will be very diffi-
cult for them to raise funds from other VCs in the future. Our results
thus understate the importance of blacklisting constraints on the en-
trepreneurial team.
3. Cross-Voting
In one firm (Firm 29), VC investors engaged in cross-voting, the
scheme used in Orban v. Fields. Firm 29, which was California-domi-
ciled, received $50 million over three rounds of VC financing and was
sold in 2004 for $20 million. At the time of sale, the VCs already con-
trolled the board of directors, the founder had already been replaced
as CEO, and the VCs collectively had liquidation preferences exceed-
ing $100 million (the third-round financing included a 3x prefer-
ence). The founder refused to vote his common stock in favor of the
98 See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 4, at 68 ("[T]he VC ... could fire the entrepre-
neur simply to take away his unvested stock . . . .").
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sale.99 Because the firm was incorporated in California, approval by a
majority of the common shareholders was necessary to sell the firm,
giving the founder some degree of blocking power. To eliminate this
holdup, the VCs converted a fraction of their preferred stock into
common shares. This maneuver did not cost the VCs anything be-
cause, as in Orban, the VCs were left postconversion with liquidation
preferences far greater than the $20 million sale price. 00
Firm 29 was the only company in our sample where this form of
cross-voting was actually used. However, other founders, especially
those of firms whose common stock was far underwater, reported that
they were aware that VCs could engage in this tactic. Thus, demands
for carve-outs to common shareholders are made in the shadow of
possible cross-voting. 01
4. Vote Buying
Vote buying reportedly occurred in one firm (Finn 49) in our
sample. The firm was California-domiciled, and there were no drag-
along rights. The founder reported that the VC-controlled board
paid the CEO and other employees to exercise underwater options to
acquire and vote common stock in favor of a trade sale for about $80
million. In addition to this stick, the VCs used a carrot: they provided
a $4 million carve-out to common shareholders. The founder sued
the VCs, alleging vote buying and improprieties associated with a
presale financing round. The case was settled for an undisclosed
amount.
Of course, implicit and essentially undetectable vote buying
might be occurring through management bonuses because of the
considerable overlap between shareholders and executives. Thus, we
cannot rule out the possibility that vote buying was occurring in other
firms in our sample.
CONCLUSION
Trade sales by VCs are actually much more common than IPOs
and, in the aggregate, are likely to be just as financially important to
VCs. However, unlike IPOs, trade sales do not trigger the intense pub-
lic-disclosure requirements of the securities laws. As a result, we know
relatively little about them.
09 The VCs in this firm did not appear to hold drag-along rights that could compel a
vote of the common shareholders.
100 See Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1,
1997).
101 The cost to VCs of cross-voting is higher if the conversion of preferred shares to
common shares reduces their total liquidation preferences below the sale price. In such
cases, cross-voting would effectively result in a carve-out for the original common
shareholders.
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In this Article, we seek to shed light on how VCs arrange to sell
startups in trade sales. In particular, we investigate how VCs induce
the founder, other executives, and common shareholders to go along
with a trade sale that they might otherwise have an incentive to resist.
We identify the types of bribes (carrots) and coercive tools
(sticks) that VCs might use to induce a reluctant entrepreneurial team
to support, or at least not impede, a trade sale. We then investigate
the use of carrots and sticks using a hand-collected database of 50 VC-
backed Silicon Valley firms sold to acquirers in 2003 and 2004. We
find, in our sample, a relatively heavy reliance on carrots. Carrots are
used in 45% of the firms, with carrots averaging 9% of deal value in
these firms. We also find some use of sticks, such as threats to blacklist
founders who refuse to cooperate and attempts to undermine com-
mon shareholders' voting rights. But the overt use of these sticks is
relatively infrequent.
Our study makes three contributions. First, it sheds light on an
important but underexplored aspect of corporate governance in pri-
vate, VC-backed firms. In particular, it highlights the potentially con-
flicting interests of the different players in VC-backed firms around
trade-sale exits and shows that VCs frequently must overcome poten-
tial opposition to these sales by founders, executives, and common
shareholders.
Second, our study provides further evidence that managers of tar-
get firms can extract value by holding up a sale of the firm. Research
has documented the frequent use of side payments to induce execu-
tives to participate in the sale of publicly traded firms. We show that
such carrots are used not only in public firms with dispersed owner-
ship but also in closely held private firms.
Third, our study provides some evidence on whether venture cap-
italists are constrained from abusing their power in startups. Al-
though venture capitalists have considerable power in startups, the
relatively infrequent overt use of sticks in our sample provides support
for the view that reputational or other nonlegal considerations con-
strain misbehavior by Silicon Valley venture capitalists. We hope that
our work is useful to practitioners and academics seeking to better
understand the corporate governance of VC-backed firms.
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